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The collapse of financial powerhouse Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 marked the start 
of a financial crisis that demonstrated the true 
meaning of globalization. The financial 
landscape was different in 1993 when Vie 
d’Or, a life insurance company established in 
the South of the Netherlands went bankrupt. 
That left about 11,000 Dutch policy holders 
without a life insurance plan and with 
damages estimated at EUR 80 million.  
 
In the Netherlands, similar to many other 
European countries, there is a strong reliance 
on regulatory oversight and enforcement. The 
general belief is that regulators are put in 
place to prevent the collapse of financial 
institutions. When an exceptional event takes 
place the Government is expected to provide 
a solution or at the very least to somehow 
facilitate a compensation scheme for the 
victims. The case study of the Vie d’Or 
litigation and settlement offers an insider 
view of how mass disputes are dealt with in a 
civil law jurisdiction in Europe.  
 
The Rise and Fall of Vie d’Or 
 
Vie d’Or was founded in 1985 by its two 
directors who combined their expertise in the 
banking and insurance sector to establish 
what in their view was an insurance company 
built on an innovative business model able to 
produce innovative insurance products. They 
developed a low priced life insurance in 
which also Merrill Lynch participated. The 
new product became very popular among mid 
and small size businesses entrepreneurs and 
independent contractors. Although relatively 
wealthy, this group is vulnerable since it has 
to provide for its own social benefits. A low 
priced life insurance product was therefore 
very attractive and initially the Vie d’Or life 
insurance was a huge success. 
 
The established insurance companies 
followed critically the sudden growth and 
popularity of Vie d’Or. They believed that a 
life insurance product could not be offered at 
such a low price and distrusted the company 
and its founders. The Netherlands is a small 
country with a “clubby” business culture. 
Business partners and competitors tend to 
know each other well. Vie d'Or was not a 
member of the Verbond van Verzekeraars, 
which is the Dutch Association of Insurers: a 
powerful lobby organization
1
 with self 
regulatory powers, representing the interests 
of private insurance companies operating in 
the Netherlands. The Association’s members 
represent more than 95% of the Dutch 
insurance market expressed in terms of gross 
premium income. Moreover, the Association 
of Insurers is often consulted by the 
Government and regulators on industry 
related issues and legislation.  
 
There were signals from the market that the 
Vie d’Or story was “too good to be true”. It 
was suggested that the Insurers Regulator 
should initiate investigations into Vie d’Or’s 
product, administration and funding model. 
Initially the warning signals of the market 
remained fruitless, but when also Vie d’Or 
policy holders started complaining the 
Insurance Regulator undertook action and in 
October 1993 it replaced the CEO of Vie 
d’Or. However, that could not prevent the 
bankruptcy of the company a few months 
later. The life insurance policies of Vie d’Or 
were taken over by another insurance 
company in August 1994, but only at a 
substantial reduction of the coverage provided 
to the 11,000 policy holders.  
                                                 
1
 The Association is an independent organization 
managed and financed by its members. See also 
https://www.verzekeraars.nl/en/Paginas/Home.aspx 
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The Netherlands doesn’t have US style 
discovery rules so other types of proceedings 
had to be used in a creative manner to 
establish the facts that led to the collapse of 
Vie d’Or. There was clearly a 
mismanagement issue
2
: Vie d’Or couldn’t 
handle the success of its product and 
adequately process the administration of its 
many new clients. Furthermore, it relied on a 
funding model that turned out to be 
inadequate. The remuneration of the 
intermediaries was too high, whereas the level 
of company reserves was too low. The 
solvency of the company was dependent on 
uncertain future profits. The products were 
indeed aggressively priced and promised too 
much. Also, one of the Directors of the 
company had used company funds to finance 
other, risky, private ventures.
3
 The balance 
sheets of the company and its annual financial 
statements did not reveal the true financial 
situation of Vie d’Or
4
 and the question was 
whether the Insurers Regulator shouldn’t have 
                                                 
2
 Mismanagement was established in the inquiry 
proceedings into the affairs of the company and its 
management at the Enterprise Chamber of the Court of 
Appeal in Amsterdam. Those are special Dutch 
proceedings regarding a company’s business policy 
often used to collect facts to substantiate damage 
claims in subsequent proceedings. M. van Hooijdonk, 
2009. The use of the enquiry proceedings in Vie d’Or 
was not so easy because of statutory restrictions that 
only shareholders of the company have standing to file 
such a request. Here, as an exception to this rule the 
Public Prosecutor filed the request because it 
concerned a matter of public order and policy.  
3
 The Criminal Prosecutor started criminal 
investigations against the Directors of the company. 
Although this  would not result in convictions, it did 
produce additional facts in support of the civil claim of 
the policy holders.   
4
 This finding was made in a report of  accountancy 
firm KPMG  that had been commissioned by the 
Foundation established to protect the interest of the 
(former) policy holders of Vie d’ Or, and confirmed in 
subsequent disciplinary proceedings against the 
accountants and the actuary. 
identified those omissions at an earlier stage, 
especially considering the early signals from 
the market. 
 
One of the respondents observed that if a 
small insurer like Vie d'Or would encounter 
financial problems, it would normally have 
been “rescued” by one or more of the 
members of the Association of Insurers and 
the issues would then be sorted out within the 
sector. The policy holders of the troubled 
insurance company would thus not suffer any 
(substantial) damages. The Association of 
Insurers would prefer to not let a (life) insurer 
go bankrupt, because that would damage the 
image of the industry and might lead to 
unwelcome regulatory interference. Indeed, 
the Vie d’Or affair eventually resulted in 
increased regulation of the insurance 
business. Another respondent commented that 
had the insurance sector known beforehand 
how Vie d’Or would have evolved, it might 
have facilitated a solution for the policy 
holders.  
 
A few explanations emerged from the 
interviews about why Vie d’Or was not 
“rescued” by the industry members. 
According to some, at that time the sector 
didn’t consider Vie d’Or as a joint problem of 
the existing insurance companies. Moreover, 
Vie d’Or was not a member of the 
Association of Insurers but an outsider. Vie 
d’Or was therefore viewed by the sector 
primarily as an issue for the Insurance 
Regulator, which however ignored the signals 
of the market with respect to Vie d’Or’s 
business practices. It has also been suggested 
that the established industry members were 
not entirely unhappy with the collapse of such 
a competitor, which would confirm the risks 
involved in entrusting your money to an 
aggressive newcomer. Finally, someone 
observed that the dilemma of regulators 
always is that they “can never do good”. The 
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Insurers Regulator might have considered that 
the implementation of an innovative business 
model within a relatively “closed shop” as the 
insurance industry was an initiative that 
deserved a fair chance. It might also have had 
doubts about whether the warning signals 
from the market had merits or were aimed 
merely at eliminating an unconventional 
competitor . Whatever the motives of the 
insurance market, the Association of Insurers 
and the Insurers Regulator  was, the result of 
their inaction was that 11,000 consumers 
were left behind with substantial damages and 
without a life insurance on which they were 
dependent. The matter drew the attention of 
politicians and in the summer of 1994 the 
Insurance Regulator incorporated the Vie 
d’Or Foundation (the Foundation) to protect 
the interests of the policy holders who 
suffered damages resulting from the 
bankruptcy of Vie d’Or. 
 
The Vie d’Or Foundation 
 
The Netherlands was one of the first 
European countries to introduce a collective 
action in April 1994, coincidently only 
shortly after Vie d’Or went bankrupt. In line 
with the collective redress tradition in many 
European countries only declaratory or 
injunctive relief is available and standing to 
act is granted only to non-profit organizations 
that meet certain criteria. The latter are 
relatively easy to meet, there is no separate 
certification stage,
5
 like in some other 
                                                 
5
 Article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code stipulates as 
follows: “1. A foundation or association with full legal 
capacity can institute an action intended to protect 
similar interests of other persons to the extent that its 
articles promote such interests. 2. A legal person 
referred to in paragraph 1 shall have no locus standi 
if, in the given circumstances, it has not made a 
sufficient attempt to achieve the objective of the action 
through consultations with the defendant. A two-week 
period from receipt by the defendant of a request for 
consultations giving particulars of the claim shall in 
jurisdictions. The organization could be a 
foundation or an association, as opposed to a 
commercial entity or an individual, whose 
articles of association explicitly enable it to 
initiate collective actions for the collective 
protection of similarly situated individuals or 
companies whose rights are infringed. The 
organization could be a special purpose 
vehicle incorporated for the purpose of a 
specific litigation or an established public or 
private interest organization like 
Consumentenbond (the Dutch Consumer 
Association) or the Vereniging voor Effecten 





Consumentenbond did not get involved in the 
Vie d’Or matter, presumably because it has 
limited resources and has to prioritize.  A 
special purpose vehicle had to be established 
to collectively protect the interests of the 
policy holders and that is why the Vie d’Or 
Foundation was incorporated by the Insurance 
Regulator. According to its articles of 
association a policy holder could not be a 
member of the Board of the Foundation and 
the Board members should be appointed by 
the Insurance Regulator. The Insurance 
Regulator also funded the initial expenses of 
the Foundation. Despite the criticism on the 
role it played in the bankruptcy of Vie d’Or, 
the Insurance Regulator wanted to make a 
statement that the matter was going to be 
dealt with not only vigorously, but also 
                                                                           
any event suffice for such purpose.”. Before an action 
can be filed, the organization is required by law to 
attempt to obtain the desired relief by means of a 
negotiated out-of-court settlement (see Kamerstukken 
II 1991/92 (Parliamentary Proceedings Second 
Chamber 1991/92) 22 486, no. 3 (Explanatory 
Memorandum)).  
6
 For a detailed discussion of standing in the Dutch 
collective actions, see I.N. Tzankova, Funding of Mass 
Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands, George 
Mason Journal of Law, Economics  & Policy, vol. 8, 
2012, nr. 3,  559-560. 
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objectively. A more skeptical view on the 
decision of the Insurance Regulator to 
incorporate the Foundation and to appoint its 
Board members is that it wanted to have some 
influence on the investigations and follow on 
actions. The Insurance Regulator appointed 
accomplished, respected and well known 
individuals to sit on the Board of the 
Foundation. For example the chairman of the 
Board of the Foundation was the former 
chairman of the Board of Directors of ING 
Bank. Throughout the years he used his 
corporate connections, knowledge, experience 
and skills solely for the benefit of the policy 
holders, on a pro bono basis.  
 
One of the first decisions of the Board after 
its appointment in August 1994 was to 
instruct a lawyer for the Foundation and an 
independent accountancy firm to investigate 
and collect facts about the cause of the 
bankruptcy, including the role of the Insurers 
Regulator. On the basis of the facts that were 
collected in the various fact finding 
proceedings that took place between 1994-
1998
7
 the Board decided to start the litigation 
in 1998 also against the Insurance Regulator 
that was not only the incorporator of the 
Foundation, but also its initial funder. The 
other defendants were the accountant of Vie 
d’ Or, the actuary and the Dutch State.The 
State was sued because at the time that the 
Insurance Regulator was privatized,  it was 
agreed that the insurance sector would 
provide the funds for any liability of the 
Insurance Regulator up to NLG 20 million, 
and that the State would indemnify the 
Insurance Regulator for any amount in excess 
thereof.  If the massive claim of the 
Foundation against the Insurance Regulator 
would be awarded, the State would therefore 
be obliged to fund a substantial part of the 
damage award.  
 
                                                 
7
 See footnotes 2-4. 
The Litigation and the Settlement  
 
The litigation was designed as a collective 
action for a declaratory relief combined with 
eleven individual test cases to determine the 
calculation of damages in relevant 
subcategories of cases. The Foundation was 
anticipating that a favorable decision on 
liability in the collective action and on 
causation and damages in the individual test 
cases would facilitate a collective settlement 
and overall resolution of the matter.  
 
Obviously the Foundation could argue that 
the directors and officers of Vie d’Or had 
failed to fulfill their contractual and fiduciary 
duties and obligations, but their personal 
assets were by far not sufficient to 
compensate the policy holders.
8
 The 
Foundation argued also that the Insurers 
Regulator performed a delegated State task, 
making the State liable if that task was not 
adequately performed. The court was also 
made aware of the fact that the State would 
have to cover for any liability of the Insurance 
Regulator in excess of NLG 20 million.  
 
According to the Foundation the accountant 
and actuaries could be held liable because the 
balance sheets of the company and its annual 
financial statements did not reveal the true 
financial situation of Vie d’Or.
9
 The 
Foundation also claimed that the Insurers 
Regulator should have identified those 
omissions, especially considering the various 
early warnings and signals from the market. 
Although the Foundation obtained favorable 
court rulings before the District Court and the 
Court of Appeal in the Hague, the Dutch 
Supreme Court ruled in 2006 in a landmark 
decision that the Insurers Regulator enjoys a 
                                                 
8
 There was no D&O liability insurance. 
9
 This finding was established in a report of KPMG and 
in subsequent disciplinary proceedings against the 
accountants and the actuaries. 
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large margin of appreciation whether or not to 
make use of its discretionary investigative and 
enforcement powers. In a way the Supreme 
Court left the case open: it ruled in favor of 
the State and the Insurers Regulator that the 
Court of Appeal had applied an inadequate 
test to establish the civil liability of a 
regulator, but the case was remanded to 
another Court of Appeal to reconsider the 
facts with the application of the correct test. 
The “new” test was less strict and thus 
disadvantageous for the Foundation. The 
Supreme Court ruling on the liability test that 
was used for the accountant offered better 
chances for the Foundation, but its factual and 
legal position with respect to the actuary was 
more challenging. The actuary had been 
succeeded by another actuary three years 
before the demise of Vie d’Or and the 
Foundation had decided not to sue the 
successor. The actuary denied any causal link 
between his conduct and the damages 
suffered by policy holders three years later. 
The Supreme Court quashed the decision of 
the Court of Appeal that there had been 
causation, and also held that a disciplinary 
offence established by a disciplinary tribunal 
would not necessarily constitute a tort against 
the policyholders.     
 
The Foundation was aware that the Supreme 
Court decision to remand the case could result 
in many more years of litigation, and that it 
was uncertain whether the defendants would 
be held liable under the new standards set by 
the Supreme Court. 
10
 Twelve years after the 
bankruptcy of Vie d’Or and several millions 
spent on fact gathering, expert opinions and 
the litigation the former policy holders had no 
expectation that compensation would be 
awarded anytime soon. Meanwhile 600 of the 
former policy holders had died in the course 
of the proceedings. The prospect that many 
more of them would pass away before the end 
                                                 
10
 HR 13 October 2006, LJN AW2080. 
of the litigation track, made it clear to the 
Foundation that another resolution had to be 
found and added substantial moral weight to 
their request to the defendants to settle.     
Political lobby attempts in favor of a final 
settlement were also initiated, but in July 
2007 the official position of the State was that 
this was not a scenario the State would 
consider.  It should be noted that the 
Netherlands has a history of political 
interference with the resolution of major 
infringements or mass disputes.
11
 When the 
then Minister of Finance Mr. Wouter Bos 
answered questions before Parliament about 
whether he was considering a final resolution 
of the matter, he answered
12
 that there was no 
legal reason to settle, whereas a settlement 
would place a burden on the industry 
members and create a precedent at the 
disadvantage of the tax payer.
13
 Earlier 
settlement attempts of the Foundation failed 
also because of this position of the State and 
the Insurers Regulator, even though the 
accountant and actuary were willing to talk. 
The standard applicable for the determination 
of failing regulatory oversight was a matter of 
principle and required a Supreme Court 
ruling. One of the respondents shared that it 
was clear from the beginning of the litigation 
that the State would insist on obtaining the 
latter.
14
 The reason for that was that if the 
                                                 
11
 Dexia and DES are examples of other major cases 
that were settled after political interference and under 
political pressure and recently the nationalization of 
SNS Bank. See I.N. Tzankova, Funding of Mass 
Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands, supra note 7, 
578, for discussion about the role of the politic in the 






 See above the privatizing arrangement between the 
State and the insurance industry with respect to the 
liability of the Insurers Regulator. 
14
 Since 2012 this would no longer be necessary. The 
Dutch Supreme Court could be requested to rule on 
questions of law. For a description and a discussion of 
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ruling of the Supreme Court on liability for 
failing regulatory oversight would be 
disadvantageous for the Regulator and 
ultimately the State, the timing would have 
been favorable to “repair” or modify the 
privatization agreement  with respect to 
contingent liabilities (see above) so the State 
would not bear the financial burden for failing 
regulatory oversight in the future.
15
   
 
Eventually the partial clarity provided by the 
Supreme Court ruling, political pressure on 
the State and Insurers Regulator and other 
external factors positively contributed to a 
change in the attitude of all parties involved. 
The Association of Insurers seems to have 
played a key role in that process. Early 2008 
the Association of Insurers announced that 
although not a party in the litigation, it was 
willing to voluntarily contribute EUR 6,5 
million to a settlement fund. The 
Association’s offer had a strategic 
background. In the past 14 years the 
regulatory landscape had changed and the 
insurance sector was facing not only stricter 
national and European regulation, but also 
negative press coverage related to the high 
costs of  (life) insurance products, the so 
called unit linked insurances. The Association 
anticipated that if it would present the offer as 
a gesture that would contribute to a more 
positive image of the industry. Also, if the 
                                                                           
the prejudicial opinion mechanism, see B. de Jong, 
Prejudiciële vragen aan de Hoge Raad bij 
massavorderingen, Ondernemingsrecht 2009, no. 106 
and I.N. Tzankova & D. Ozmis, De evaluatie van de 
WCAM: de kernthema’s uitgelicht, Tijdschrift voor 
Civiele Rechtspleging, no. 2, 37-38. 
 
15
 In meanwhile such legislation has been enacted with 
respect to the Financial markets regulators: AFM and 
DNB As from 1
st
 July 2012 article 1:25d of  the Dutch 
Financial Supervision Act (Wet financieel toezicht) 
stipulates that the AFM and DNB cannot be held liable 
for damages resulting from improper supervision, 
unless the improper supervision is attributable to intent 
or gross negligence. 
Insurers Regulator would be held liable, the 
bill would be presented  to the industry 
anyway, given the arrangements made with 
respect to the costs of the Insurers Regulator 
and contingent liabilities for failing regulatory 
oversight. The offer of the Association seems 
to have been the last push the parties needed 
to reach a final resolution.  
 
In May 2008 it was officially announced that 
parties had reached a final settlement 
agreement creating a settlement fund of EUR 
45 million.
16
 The parties who contributed to 
this fund in addition to the Association of 
Insurers were the Foundation,
17
 the 
accountant and the actuary. Although the 
State and the Insurers Regulator formally did 
not contribute to the settlement fund, the 
Insurers Regulator facilitated the settlement 
by retroactively volunteering to cover all 
costs and expenses the Foundation had 
incurred over the past 15 years (EUR 8,5 
million) so that the previously collected 
settlement funds (see above) and the 
settlement fund of EUR 45 million could be 
used entirely for the claims of the policy 
holders.
18
 The picture that emerged from the 
interviews is that various parties for varying 
reasons were willing to contribute to a 
resolution of the matter at last, but at their 
terms and conditions. Moreover there was the 
willingness needed to facilitate each others’ 





 Some reserved funds left from the bankruptcy of Vie 
d’Or, that could be “set free” only in the case of a final 
resolution. 
18
 The former policy holders would receive about 50% 
of the nominal value of their claims, but no interest). 
Parties agreed further that defendants would settle 
without admitting liability, that the exact contributions 
of the various parties to the settlement fund would 
remain confidential, that they would file a petition to 
declare the settlement agreement binding and that the 
minimum participation rate of the policy holders 
should be 90%. The take up rate was ultimately 99,8%. 
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wishes and preferences. Each party obtained 
what it considered important. The 
contribution of the Association of Insurers 
generated the anticipated favorable media 
coverage and a collective settlement declared 
binding on an opt-out basis would cap the 
exposure of the Insurers Regulator, the State 
and the industry. The wish of some of the 
defendants to keep the amount of the 
individual contributions to the fund 
confidential was respected  by all parties 
involved and the financial contribution of the 
Insurers Regulator and the State received a 
special treatment. It was named and presented 
differently to emphasize that there was no 
State liability for failing regulatory oversight 
and no legal reason to contribute to the 
settlement fund. Last but not least, the 
Foundation was at that point less concerned 
about the labels parties put on their 
contributions  but understandably focused on 
the aggregate amount that would be generated 
and become available for the policy holders. 
This resulted in a compensation of about 50% 
of the damages of the policy holders.
 
Although the  interest on the claims was not 
compensated, the settlement was greeted with 
relief by the former policy holders.  
 
The parties to the settlement filed a petition to 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal under the 
Dutch Act on Collective Settlements, a 
mechanism introduced in 2005 that was 
inspired by the US settlement only-practice.
19
 
No objectors appeared and the settlement 
agreement was approved and declared 
binding by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in 
April 2009. There were no opt outs. The fund 
was distributed and in 2012 the Foundation 
was dissolved. 16 years after the bankruptcy 
of Vie d’Or the matter was finally resolved.  
                                                 
19
 For a description and discussion of the Dutch 
collective settlement regime, see generally I.N. 
Tzankova, Funding of Mass Disputes: Lessons from 
the Netherlands, supra note 7, 561-669. 
 
Lessons Learned  
 
The Vie d’Or case study reveals how political 
culture and the dynamics within an industry 
can play a significant role in the emergence of 
a mass dispute, its development and in its 
ultimate resolution. The Netherlands has the 
kind of business culture that could have 
prevented the collapse of Vie d’Or, if the life 
insurance community had realized at an 
earlier stage that the financial problems of the 
company were not only an issue for the 
Insurance Regulator. The Vie d’Or case study 
demonstrates that the collapse of a financial 
institution in the Netherlands is not an 
isolated phenomenon, but has significant 
consequences for the business practice of all 
industry players, because it contributes to an 





Europeans tend to rely on the protection of 
the State and regulators. However, these key 
players do  not only have regulatory powers, 
but also the power to negotiate the terms of 
privatization of regulatory oversight, the 
power to set new rules and even to apply 
those rules in existing disputes. Rules that 
make it easier to present the bill of a failing 
regulatory oversight to parties and industry 
players who cannot be blamed for the 
mistakes or unfortunate judgment calls of 
other companies, individuals or regulators. 
Companies and multinationals facing mass 
                                                 
20
 The bankruptcy of Vie d’Or led to the introduction 
of “Opvangregeling Leven”: a measure that was 
established by the industry aiming to prevent the 
bankruptcy of a life insurance company. In essence the 
Opvangregeling Leven is a fund that can make EUR 
100 million available to each life insurer that 
experience difficulties. The aim of the fund is to make 
the life insurer healthy again and prevent its 
bankruptcy. If a bankruptcy can’t be avoided, the 
policy holders become preferent creditors. See for 
more info www.dnb.nl or www.verzekeraars.nl  
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disputes in Europe should be aware of the 
significant role States, regulators and politics 
may play in the resolution of mass disputes. 
This broader context makes the outcome of 
such cases unpredictable, and reduces the 
reliance a company can place on the legal 
realities present at the start of the conflict. For 
a company an unpredictable scenario is the 
worst case scenario. 
 
This requires from companies facing a mass 
dispute in Europe and their external advisors 
a broader view and a proactive attitude that 
departs from the traditional way of thinking 
about the handling of mass disputes. Early 
identification of the relevant stakeholders, 
potential alliances and the political 
implications of the matter, could be very 
complex, but are essential and equally 
important as the development and 
implementation of a clever defense litigation 
strategy. Ironically, in Vie d’Or the industry 
would have preferred an early rather than a 
late collective settlement, but that would have 
required a proactive attitude and the 
willingness to pay long before a final court 
decision on the merits 
 
Vie d’Or also demonstrates the importance of 
the availability of a device like the Dutch Act 
on collective settlements that allows parties to 
close the books and bring a conflict to a well-
orchestrated end.
21
    
                                                 
21
 The case study was conducted in collaboration with 
Prof. Dr. Deborah R. Hensler, Stanford University and 
builds on interviews with eight individuals representing 
the interests of various stakeholders in the Vie d’Or 
litigation. 
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